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COMMENTS
INTERNATIONAL DATABASE PROTECTION: A
MULTILATERAL TREATY SOLUTION TO THE
UNITED STATES' DATABASE DILEMMA
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of database protection has long been a topic of
scholastic debate.' Law students and professors alike have
surmised how Congress should react to both the Supreme
Court's 1991 holding in Feist v. Rural Telephone2 and the Eu-
ropean Union's subsequent efforts to draft the Database Di-
rective. 3 However, little discussion exists on how the United
States has worked with the World Intellectual Property Or-
1. See infra note 3 and accompanying text.
2. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991).
Feist Publications, Inc., specializes in publishing area-wide telephone directo-
ries that include both white pages and yellow pages. Id. at 342. Feist Publica-
tions attempted to license Rural Telephone's white pages directory that covered
a particular region in Kansas. Id. at 343. However, Rural Telephone refused to
provide its competitor with any information. Id. As a result, Feist Publications
simply copied the desired information from Rural Telephone's white pages
without Rural's permission. Id. at 343-44. Rural Telephone did not appreciate
this procurement and proceeded to sue Feist Publications for copyright infringe-
ment. Id. at 344. The lawsuit found its way to the United States Supreme
Court, which held that Rural Telephone's white pages directory, along with all
of the listings within it, were left totally unprotected by copyright law. Id. at
362-64.
3. Council Directive 96/9/EC, 1996 O.J. (L 77/20) 20 [hereinafter Direc-
tive]. See discussion infra Part II.B.1-2. See generally J. H. Reichman, Elec-
tronic Information Tools-The Outer Edge of World Intellectual Property Law, U.
DAYTON L. REv. 797 (1992); William S. Strong, Database Protection After Feist
v. Rural Telephone Co., 42 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 39 (1994); Paul Durdik,
Note, Ancient Debate, New Technology: The European Community Moves to
Protect Computer Databases, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 153 (1994); Anant S.
Narayanan, Note, Standards of Protection for Databases in the European Com-
munity and the United States: Feist and the Myth of Creative Originality, 27
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 457 (1993) [hereinafter Narayanan]; Charles
Von Simson, Note, Feist or Famine: American Database Copyright as an Eco-
nomic Model for the European Union, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 729 (1995).
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ganization ("WIPO")4 to create a comprehensive form of inter-
national database protection,5 and what has motivated it to
do so. This comment focuses on these two questions.
On March 11, 1996, the European Union launched a new
form of intellectual property protection for databases6 by
passing the long awaited Database Directive.7 As enacted,
the Directive establishes a form of comprehensive database
protection within the European Union that exceeds the cur-
rent level provided by U.S. law.8 Under the Directive, Euro-
pean Union database companies are legally protected from
competitors downloading or copying their compilations of raw
data, while most U.S. companies are not.9 The U.S. database
industry now fears it cannot compete with the European
database industry on a level playing field due to the lack of
U.S. protection. 10
In response, the Clinton Administration has presented
the issue of international database protection to WIPO for
multilateral treaty negotiations." WIPO, a specialized
agency within the United Nations system, held a Diplomatic
Conference in December of 1996 to address international
4. WIPO is a specialized agency, within the United Nations system, that
administers multilateral intellectual property treaties. WIPO, WORLD INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION: GENERAL INFORMATION 7-8 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter WIPO GENERAL INFORMATION].
5. The term "comprehsive database protection" in this comment refers to a
form of legal protection that guards both the format and the raw data within a
database from unauthorized copying.
6. Unless specified otherwise, "database" shall mean a "collection of works,
data or other independent materials arranged in a systematic or methodical
way and capable of being individually accessed by electronic or other means."
Directive, supra note 3, at 24. This definition includes works that are primarily
compilations of facts, such as the white pages directory discussed in Feist, 499
U.S. at 345.
7. Directive, supra note 3.
8. See Feist, 499 U.S. 340. See also infra note 38 and accompanying text
(discussing the Supreme Court's holding in Feist).
9. See discussion infra Part II.B.4. See also discussion infra Part IV.A.1
(discussing the growing concerns within the United States database industry).
10. Information Industry Association, Database Protection: An Industry
Perspective on the Issues, 2-3 (August 1995) (on file with the Santa Clara Uni-
versity Law Library) [hereinafter IIA Perspective].
11. WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTs, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 147-53 (1995)
[hereinafter White Paper]. The United States, along with 150 other nations, is
a member of WIPO. WIPO GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 4, at 10. See
infra Part II.C.2. for a detailed discussion of WIPO's role in forming multilat-
eral treaties that protect intellectual property rights.
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database protection, among other copyright issues. 12 During
the conference, Member States of WIPO were expected to ne-
gotiate for database protection in two different international
agreements: 13 a protocol to the Berne Convention (hereinaf-
ter "Berne Protocol"), and a new treaty (hereinafter "New
Instrument"). 14
Prior to the Diplomatic Conference, the Clinton Adminis-
tration proposed treaty language on database protection for
WIPO to consider. 5 The United States' initial proposal pro-
vided database protection through the Berne Protocol. 16 But
in May of 1996 the Administration submitted a second propo-
sal, which called for sui generis database protection17 to be
provided in a New Instrument.'" The Administration
couched its second proposal in terms of the general need to
enhance international copyright protection for the digital
age.19 However, by providing such a broad justification, the
12. WIPO Press Release No. 103, (visited Sept. 22, 1996) <http://
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/diplconf.html> [hereinafter WIPO Press
Release No. 103].
13. WIPO Press Release No. 103, supra note 12. At the time this comment
went to press, the Diplomatic Conference had yet to convene.
14. The Berne Protocol and a New Instrument are two different forms of
international agreements or treaties which the United States could enter
through WIPO to enhance international database protection. WIPO Press Re-
lease No. 103, supra note 12. See discussion infra Part II.C.3 for a detailed
explanation of the Berne Protocol and a New Instrument.
15. U.S. Proposal for Sui Generis Protection of Databases, May 23, 1996
[hereinafter U.S. Sui Generis Treaty Proposal] (on file with the Santa Clara
University Law Library).
16. Letter from Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks to Arpad Bogsch, Director General,
World Intellectual Property Organization (Nov. 29, 1995), including U.S. Propo-
sal for the Protocol to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, art. 2(3) [hereinafter Berne Protocol Proposal] (on file with the
Santa Clara University Law Library). See also discussion infra Part II.C.4.
17. For the purposes of this comment, "sui generis database protection" is a
non-copyright, custom-crafted intellectual property law designed to protect the
factual elements within a database that United States copyright law leaves un-
protected. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 215 (1994). An example of sui generis protection is the
legal right of a database compiler to protect against unfair or unauthorized ex-
traction of facts or data from the database. Directive, supra note 3, art. 7(1), at
25.
18. U.S. Sui Generis Treaty Proposal, supra, note 15.
19. Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention and
Committee of Experts on a Possible Instrument for the Protection of the Rights of
Performers and Producers of Phonograms, WIPO Draft Report at 69 (May 22 to
24, 1994) (WIPO document BCP/CEIVII/4 Prov.-INR/CE/VII4 Prov.) [hereinaf-
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United States failed to address the following questions: 1)
Why is it important for the United States to establish inter-
national sui generis database protection; and, more impor-
tantly, 2) how would multilateral treaty provisions in the
Berne Protocol and a New Instrument create a comprehen-
sive form of international database protection?2 °
This comment answers both of these questions by ad-
dressing several critical sub-issues. Part II of this comment
first explains how the U.S. Supreme Court planted the seeds
for the United States' database dilemma with its decision in
Feist.21 Part II then discusses the European Union's efforts
to develop the Database Directive and examines the Direc-
tive's effect on the U.S. database industry.22 Next, Part II ex-
plains the difference between the Berne Protocol and a New
Instrument, as well as summarizes the Clinton Administra-
tion's proposals and treaty-making policies regarding inter-
national database protection.
23
However, as Part III points out, both U.S. treaty propos-
als have left important database protection and treaty-form-
ing issues unanswered.24 To address these issues, Part IV
clarifies the United States' primary objective and possible ra-
tionale in promoting international database protection 25 and
analyzes why certain treaty proposals would never achieve
U.S. objectives.26
Finally, this comment proposes a comprehensive form of
international database protection utilizing both the Berne
Protocol and a New Instrument. By following this path, the
United States will enjoy a harmonized form of database pro-
tection that serves the interests of the American taxpayer,
the database industry, and the U.S. government alike. This
comment then concludes that despite the present absence of
greater domestic protection, the United States should negoti-
ate for a comprehensive form of international database pro-
ter Committee of Experts] (on file with the Santa Clara University Law
Library).
20. Id.
21. See discussion infra Part II.A.
22. See discussion infra Part II.B.
23. See discussion infra Part II.C.
24. See discussion infra Part III.
25. See discussion infra Part V.A.
26. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
27. See discussion infra Part WV.B.
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A. The Fear of Feist
All databases consist of two basic elements, the selection
and arrangement of data, i.e., the format, and the data it-
self.29 Prior to the 1991 decision in Feist, many database
companies falsely assumed that copyright laws provided com-
prehensive protection for both database elements.3° Rural
Telephone made this same assumption when it unsuccess-
fully sued Feist Publications for the verbatim copying of the
Rural Telephone white pages directory.3 1 Today, because of
the Supreme Court's ruling in Feist, reliance on copyright law
as a comprehensive form of database protection has
diminished. 2
The current canvas of U.S. copyright law does not protect
raw facts.3 3 Yet, much of the data within a database consists
of raw facts4.3  Thus, most data remains unprotected under
U.S. copyright law. This lack of protection for facts applies to
all works of authorship, whether the work is a book or a
database.35 The Copyright Act of 1976 expressly allows pro-
tection in the United States to reach all "original works of
28. See discussion infra Part VI.
29. IIA Perspective, supra note 10, at 5. For example, the white pages di-
rectory in a telephone book consists of both a format and data. The directory is
formatted alphabetically by name, and the data includes names, phone num-
bers, and addresses. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 343 (1991).
30. Baila Celedonia, From Copyright to Copycat: Open Season on Data,
PUBLISHERS WKLY., Aug. 16, 1991 at 34.
31. Feist, 499 U.S. at 344. See supra note 18 and accompanying text for a
description of the facts in Feist.
32. IIA Perspective, supra note 10, at 11.
33. Id. at 10-11
34. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 17.
35. The Copyright Act of 1976 extends copyright protection to compilations
such as databases, but only to a limited extent. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988). Sec-
tion 103(b) of the 1976 Act provides, in pertinent part, that "[tihe copyright in a
compilation or derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the
author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed
in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material."
§ 103(b).
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authorship,"3 6 but no corner, stitch, or pocket of the copyright
canvas stretches far enough to protect facts themselves. 7
All applications or theories of copyright law, such as
"sweat of the brow" or "industrious collection," that attempt
to protect facts alone, contradict the Supreme Court's ruling
in Feist.8 The Court held that such broad protection of facts
would undermine the constitutional cornerstone upon which
the confines of U.S. copyright law have been built: original-
ity.39 Simply put, facts (whether they are included in a book
or compiled in a database) do not meet the originality re-
quirement of U.S. copyright law.4°
But this lack of protection for facts does not necessarily
exclude all elements of a database from copyright protection.
Copyright protects an author's factual compilation to the ex-
tent that his or her selection, coordination, or arrangement of
the facts is original.41 In other words, you may not copy facts
from a database if, in the process, you would consequently
copy the database's original format.
Originality, as the term is used in copyright, imposes two
requirements on an author seeking copyright protection: A
work must be original to the author (as opposed to copied
from other works), and it must possesses at least some mini-
36. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
37. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 341 (1991).
Section 102(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act provides: "In no case does copyright
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, pro-
cess, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
38. Feist, 499 U.S. at 346. Lower courts used the "sweat of the brow" and
"industrious collection" theories to extend copyright protection to compilations
that were the products of hard work, regardless of their originality. Id. at 352.
But in Feist, the Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional for such theo-
ries to protect the raw facts under U.S. copyright law, because there was no
originality in the selection, coordination, or arrangement of raw facts. Id.
39. Id. at 351 (stating that "[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement.").
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
40. Feist, 499 U.S. at 356. Congress enacted § 103 of the Copyright Act of
1976 "to make it clear that copyright in a compilation did not extend to the facts
themselves." Id.
41. Id. at 358. Section 103(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act provides in perti-
nent part: "The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to
the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the
preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive
right on the preexisting material." § 103(b).
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mal level of creativity.42 It is possible for an author to format
factual data in an original manner. However, authors never
create facts; therefore, facts themselves cannot qualify as
original works of authorship.43
Even if a compiler of a database selected or arranged
facts in a creative format, any resulting copyright would only
protect the database's format to the extent that its selection
or arrangement was original.44 "The mere fact that a work is
copyrighted does not mean that every element of the work
may be protected."45 As a result, copyright protection of
databases is rather thin, because the facts themselves remain
unprotected elements within the work.46
But what is the commercial significance of this lack of
protection for facts? It depends on the nature of the work.
Non-fiction books, like most literary works, enjoy "thick"
copyright protection, despite the lack of protection for facts.47
For example, the authored text of Copyright's Highway, by
noted copyright scholar Paul Goldstein, is protected by copy-
right,48 whereas the alphabetical compilation of people, com-
panies, cases, and other facts in the index remains unpro-
tected. 49 Therefore, copying the index of facts does not
infringe the book's copyright.5 0 Fortunately, for Professor
Goldstein's pecuniary interests, the majority of the book's
contents and commercial value is in the authored text, which
makes the lack of copyright protection for the index commer-
cially insignificant.
42. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. The Court held that the selection of the white
pages directory "lacks the modicum of creativity necessary to transform mere
selection into copyrightable expression." Id. at 362.
43. No author, including the compiler of a database, may claim that the
facts compiled are original, "because facts do not owe their origin to an act of
authorship." Id. at 347.
44. Id. at 348.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 349. "[Tlhe copyright in a factual compilation is thin." Id.
47. JONATHAN BAND & MASANOBU KOTAH, INTERFACES ON TRIAL: INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY AND INTEROPERABILITY IN THE GLOBAL SOFrwARE INDUSTRY 111
(1995).
48. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 17.
49. Feist, 499 U.S. at 363. The Court in Feist expressly stated that "there is
nothing remotely creative about arranging names alphabetically in a white
pages directory." Id. Therefore, it follows that listing facts alphabetically in an
index also lacks minimal creativity by the author, thereby leaving the format or
arrangement of the index unprotected by copyright law.
50. Id.
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However, this same lack of protection for facts in a
database is not at all insignificant. In fact, most of a
database's contents and commercial value lies in the com-
piled facts.5 ' Consider for example a telephone book, such as
the one discussed in Feist.52 A white pages directory is a
database, as it arranges names, telephone numbers, and
other data in a "systematic or methodical" alphabetical list.
53
The white pages directory is a significant portion of any tele-
phone book, and the use of the directory is central to the com-
mercial value of the telephone book as a whole.5 4 This value
to users is one of the main reasons a telephone company in-
vests the time and money necessary to compile and include
the white pages in its telephone book.5 5 Yet, there is no way
under U.S. copyright law for the telephone company to pro-
tect this investment from competitors.
56
However, unlike a standard, alphabetized white pages
directory,57 the format of most databases will include some
degree of original selection or coordination, providing the
database with a thin layer of copyright protection.58 Never-
theless, this thin layer offers little solace to the database in-
dustry. In Feist, the Court expressly stated that "only a com-
piler's selection and arrangement may be protected; the raw
facts may be copied at will."'5 9 As a result, copyright protec-
tion for a database often ends where the database's value
begins. °
Herein lies the fear for most database compilers and the
database industry as a whole.6 ' With such a thin layer of
protection, the threat of piracy may discourage the develop-
51. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 211.
52. The central issue in Feist was whether the copyright protection of Rural
Telephone Services' telephone book extended to names, addresses and phone
numbers as they appeared in the white pages directory. Feist, 499 U.S. at 342.
53. See supra note 6 (defining the term "database").
54. Feist, 499 U.S. at 343.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 350.
57. The alphabetical listing of a white pages directory "is not only unorigi-
nal, it is practically inevitable." Id. at 363.
58. "[Tlhe vast majority of [database] compilations will satisfy the test of
originality in selection, coordination or arrangement," thereby establishing at
least a thin layer of copyright protection that prohibits "verbatim copying." IIA
Perspective, supra note 10, at 10.
59. Feist, 499 U.S. at 350.
60. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 12.
61. IIA Perspective, supra note 10, at 5.
[Vol. 37434
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ment of commercially valuable databases.2 Why spend the
time and money necessary to compile a database when com-
petitors can copy and exploit it for their own profit?6 3 Under
this school of thought, the consumer is the ultimate victim of
the Feist decision, because no one will be willing to compile
the data the consumer needs.64
Although the database industry and legal scholars alike
believe databases "get less protection from copyright than
their producers need to support the expense of data collection
and assembly,"65 there is arguably no need for greater legal
protection. The reason for this is twofold.
First, there are alternative, non-legal solutions to
database protection, referred to as "post-Feist business strat-
egies," that could be improved. 66 These protective strategies
include encryption, contractual restrictions, and maximizing
existing copyright protection by selecting or arranging the
data in an original format. 67 The Information Industry Asso-
ciation (a trade group that represents and lobbies for leading
62. Data and databases "get less protection from copyright than their pro-
ducers need to support the expense of data collection and assembly." GOLD-
STEIN, supra note 17, at 211.
63. See generally IIA Perspective, supra note 10 (discussing current con-
cerns in the database industry). 'The issue before the information industry is
whether the protection provided under current copyright law, buttressed by
contract and other non-copyright strategies [of protection], singly or in combi-
nation, outweighs the potential risks that some perceive in committing re-
sources to the development of databases in the post-Feist environment." Id. at
14.
64. "Feist's result may well serve as a disincentive to companies considering
the compilation of factual databases." ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp.
640, 647 (W.D. Wis. 1996). Reminiscent of Feist, the district court in ProCD
found Zeidenberg innocent of copyright infringement after he uploaded ProCD's
CD-ROM telephone listings onto the Internet. Id. at 640.
65. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 211. The IIA Perspective also states that
"the substantial investment involved in... databases might not be adequately
secured other than by new, general statutory language that would restrict or
eliminate the ability of others to copy all or a substantial part of their content."
IIA Perspective, supra note 10, at 16-17.
66. IIA Perspective, supra note 10, at 11.
67. Id. at 11. An August 1991 article in Publishers Weekly predicted that
the fear of Feist was unrealistic.
[Tihe fear that . . . the business of compilers has been destroyed is
unrealistic. After all, non-copyright protection, such as contract and
trade-secret law remains. Also, unique access to timely information
will allow some compilers to continue to license their databases to
others. And for most directories and databases, at least some form of
compilation copyright protection continues.
Celedonia, supra note 30, at 34.
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electronic database companies) 68 has even suggested that due
to post-Feist business strategies, commercially valuable
databases have continued to proliferate in the United States
despite the lack of greater legal protection.69
The healthy state of the U.S. database industry leads to
the second argument against increasing the legal protection
for databases. Many members of the legal community believe
that the present level of intellectual property protection af-
forded by copyright is sufficient, and anything greater would
actually stifle economic growth.70 The most common support
for this view is found in the rapid proliferation of multimedia
information on the Internet. 71 Although all original works of
authorship found on the Internet are protected by copy-
right,72 all lists, compilations, and databases on the Internet
are subject to the same thin layer of copyright protection es-
tablished in Feist.73
Arguably, this thin layer of protection is one of the driv-
ing forces that has allowed the Internet and its surrounding
industry to grow at such an explosive and productive rate.74
68. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 213.
69. IIA Perspective, supra note 10, at iv.
70. See ERIC SCHLACHTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION REGIMES IN
THE AGE OF THE INTERNET (1995) (on file with the Santa Clara University Law
Library).
71. See id. at 3. The Internet is a massive international network of in-
dependent computer systems designed to allow the systems to communicate
with each other through text, sounds, and graphics. See Dennis W. Chiu, Com-
ment, Obscenity on the Internet, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 185, 185 n.12 (1995)
and accompanying text.
72. But see United States v. LaMaccia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994), in
which the district court ruled the defendant could not be held liable for criminal
copyright infringement. Defendant established a computer bulletin board on
the Internet and encouraged his Internet correspondents to exchange copy-
rightable software for free via the bulletin board. Id. at 536. The court held
that copyright law provided the full range of penalties available for criminal
copyright infringement actions, but that criminal copyright law could not cover
defendant's noncommercial activities. Id. at 544-45.
73. Copyright protection under Feist would be thin for a digital database on
the Internet, because it would only protect the database to the extent that its
format was original, leaving the raw data unprotected. Feist v. Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991). What exactly should con-
stitute infringement of protected works when in digital form, however, remains
in question. It is the primary topic of debate surrounding the Clinton Adminis-
tration's proposed amendments to Title 17 of the 1976 Copyright Act. See
White Paper, supra note 11, app. 1, at 2 (proposing the inclusion of "transmis-
sion" in the definition of "distribution" under 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)).
74. "The Internet today connects more than 45,000 separate networks and
25 to 30 million users in more than 100 countries, and is growing at the rate of
[Vol. 37436
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As a result, rather than fearing Feist, members of the In-
ternet industry have reason to embrace it. But whether or
not the database industry's fear of Feist is justified is a minor
concern for the purposes of this comment.75 The point is that
the fear exists and has consequently fueled the legislative
fires necessary to forge non-copyright, sui generis protection
of the facts and data compiled in databases. The fear was not
confined to the United States, and as a result legislation for
greater database protection came from an unexpected source,
the European Union.76
Although this fear was sparked in 1991, domestic legisla-
tion for sui generis database protection was not proposed in
the United States until May of 1996 by Congressman Carlos
Moorhead's Database Investment Act.77 In Europe, the same
fear had surfaced as early as 1988,78 and the cries for legisla-
tive action were answered much earlier.79 As a result, the
Database Directive now requires the European Union's fif-
teen Member States80 to provide for a sui generis form of
database protection in their respective countries before Janu-
750,000 new users per month." Fred H. Cate, The First Amendment and the
National Information Infrastructure, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 36 (1995).
75. See infra Part IV (analyzing the need for sui generis protection of
databases). But see generally J. H. Reichman, Electronic Information Tools -
The Outer Edge of World Intellectual Property Law, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 797
(1992) (discussing increased protection for commercially valuable information
that is of low-level authorship).
76. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 214.
77. Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996,
H.R. 3531, 104th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter U.S. Database Investment Act] (a
bill to amend title 15 of the United States Code to promote investment and
prevent intellectual property piracy with respect to databases). See generally
Narayanan, supra note 3 (discussing the need for increased database protection
in the United States via state or federal legislation).
78. See Copyright and the Challenge of Technology - Copyright Issues Re-
quiring Immediate Action: Green Paper from the Commission of the European
Communities, COM(88)172 final at 6 [hereinafter Green Paper]. The European
Community feared it had fallen far behind in the electronic information service
industry, with France, Germany, and England accounting for only 7% of the
1985 global market, which was more than 5 billion worldwide U.S.D. Id.
79. See Narayanan, supra note 3, at 469-72.
80. As of January of 1995, there were fifteen Member States of the Euro-
pean Union: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the
UK IAN BARNES & PAMELA M. BARNES, THE ENLARGED EuRoPEAN UNION 32
(1995).
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ary 1, 1998. 81 How exactly the Directive became law requires
further explanation.
B. The EU Database Directive
In 1992, the European Commission8 2 issued a timely
counter to the Feist decision in the form of its Proposal for a
Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases.8 3
The 1992 Proposal became the subject of international debate
and certain provisions underwent extensive revisions,8 4 in-
cluding the form, scope, and term of protection. 5
1. The Initial Form of Protection Conflicted with
United States Law
The 1992 Proposal provided for two levels of database
protection. 6 The first tier provided copyright protection to
the extent that the selection or arrangement of data was orig-
inal.8 7 The second tier directed Member States to prevent the
unauthorized extraction or re-utilization of data within a
database. 8
81. Directive, supra note 3, art. 16(1), at 27. Directives enacted by the Eu-
ropean Union do not directly amend the law of the European Union Member
States; rather for a directive to become effective, each Member State must pass
the appropriate legislation necessary to conform its law with the directive's sub-
stantive provisions. Maastricht Treaty on European Union, Union Treaty, Feb.
2, 1992, art. 189(b), 37 U.N.T.S. 240, 269 [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty].
82. The European Commission is within the legislative branch of the Euro-
pean Union. BARNES, supra note 80, at 15. It is responsible for drafting direc-
tive proposals and amended proposals, which are then passed onto the Euro-
pean Council and Parliament for joint consideration. Id.
83. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of
Databases, COM(92)24 final at 2 [hereinafter 1992 Proposal]. A directive pro-
posed by the Commission is not finalized or binding upon the Member States
until it has passed the necessary submission, amendment, and approval proce-
dures required jointly by the European Parliament and the Council. Maas-
tricht Treaty, supra note 81, at 269.
84. See discussion infra Part II.B.1-3 (discussing the revision process of the
1992 Proposal).
85. See Narayanan, supra note 3, at 472-77 (discussing in detail the various
substantive provisions of the Proposed Database Directive).
86. See infra notes 89 and 90 and accompanying text.
87. 1992 Proposal, supra note 83, art. 2(3). Article 2(3) of the 1992 Proposal
provides in pertinent part that "[a] database shall be protected by copyright if it
is original in the sense that it is a collection of works or material which, by
reason of their selection or their arrangement, constitutes the author's own in-
tellectual creation." Id. This standard is subject to the same originality re-
quirements set by Feist. See discussion supra Part II.A.
88. 1992 Proposal, supra note 83, art. 2(5). The Commission rejected the
sui generis approach for protection in its 1992 Proposal, because its implemen-
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Although the Commission attempted to distinguish this
new form of protection from copyright law, it failed to base it
on a sui generis right distinctly separate from copyright.
8 9
Consequently, it was possible that European Union Member
States would have used copyright law to protect against the
unfair extraction of raw data.90 Such an application of copy-
right law would have placed the second tier's protective scope
in direct conflict with U.S. copyright law in light of the Feist
decision. 1
2. British Opposition to the Directive's Initial Scope
and Term of Protection
The 1992 Proposal limited the scope of protection in both
tiers to electronic databases, 92 and held the term of protec-
tion in the second tier to just ten years.9 3 The United King-
dom's (hereinafter "UK") database industry, which accounted
for 60% of the European Union's 1993 database business,
found the term and scope provisions very disconcerting.9 4
A strong British coalition, led by the Confederation of
British Industry, the Direct Marketing Association and the
Periodical Publishers Association, lobbied against the 1992
Proposal.9 5 The coalition claimed that the two-tier system as
devised would drastically reduce the existing level of
database protection under British copyright law.96
Particularly troubling was the proposal's limitation to
electronic databases only.97 As a result, it was unresolved
how non-electronic works, such as database printouts or
tation by the Member States would be too gradual if established by case law,
and "protection outside of the Community would have to be provided by bilat-
eral agreement or international convention." Narayanan, supra note 3, at
n.100.
89. 1992 Proposal, supra note 83, art. 2(5). The 1992 Proposal defines the
second tier of protection for database developers as "the right of the maker of a
database to prevent acts of extraction and re-utilization of material from that
database for commercial purposes." 1992 Proposal, supra note 83, art. 1(2).
90. 1992 Proposal, supra note 83, art. 1(2).
91. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
92. 1992 Proposal, supra note 83, art. 1(1).
93. Id. art. 9(3).
94. Robin Cobb, The Database Fightback; Database Producers Oppose Elim-
ination of Copyright Protection, MARKETING, Feb. 18, 1993, at 30, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, MAGS File.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 1992 Proposal, supra note 83, art. 1(1).
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printed directories, would be protected.98 In addition, the
proposed ten-year term of protection was far below the fifty-
year term of protection the UK had achieved under British
copyright law.99 Consequently, the UK pushed the Commis-
sion to increase the term and scope of protection closer to the
level allowed under British law. 100
3. The Final Form, Scope, and Term of Protection
The European Union minimized conflicts with U.S. and
British law by making significant amendments to the 1992
Proposal, 10 ' which culminated in the adoption of the
Database Directive. 0 2 The European Union Member States
are now bound to bring their law into compliance with the
Directive 0 3 before January 1, 1998.14
As with prior proposals, the Directive divides protection
into two tiers.'0 5 The first tier protects databases under copy-
right law to the extent that the selection and arrangement of
the data is original.1 0 6 This form of copyright protection re-
98. Cobb, supra note 94, at 30, 31. Such ambiguity could exclude certain
forms of non-electronic, computer generated works from protection that would
have remained protected under existing British copyright law. Id.
99. Id. at 30. The UK lobbyists argued that a ten-year term of protection
against unfair extraction is insufficient, because "[iut does not allow sufficient
time for database owners to recoup their investment, it might deter future in-
vestment in major database projects and it ignores the fact that databases are
continuously updated so that at the expiry of the ten-year period the data held
could be completely changed." Id. at 30, 31.
100. Id.
101. The most significant amendments were made in the Commission's 1993
Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases.
1992 Proposal, supra note 83, at 2.
102. Directive, supra note 3, art. 16(1), at 27.
103. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 81, art. 189(b), at 269. Choosing the ex-
act form and methods of compliance with a directive is left up to the individual
Member States. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 81, art. 189(b), at 269.
104. Directive, supra note 3, art. 16(1), at 27.
105. Id. art. 3 and 7(1), at 25.
106. Id. art. 3, at 25. The copyright protection provision of the Directive pro-
vides in pertinent part:
1. [Dlatabases which, by reason of the selection or arrangement of
their contents, constitute the author's own intellectual creation
shall be protected as such by copyright. No other criteria shall be
applied to determine their eligibility for that protection.
2. The copyright protection of databases.., shall not extend to their
contents and shall be without prejudice to any rights subsisting in
those contents themselves.
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mains consistent with the first tier in the 1992 Proposal.
1 0 7
However, the Commission did make significant changes to
the Directive's final version. In particular, the Commission
expanded the scope of protection in both tiers to include all
forms of databases, rather than limiting protection to elec-
tronic databases. 10 8
In addition, the Commission eased international conflicts
by amending the form and term of protection in the second
tier. By including article 7.1 in the Directive, the Commis-
sion eliminated a source of possible conflict with U.S. copy-
right law.109 This provision expressly requires Member
States to base the second tier of protection on a sui generis
right that is separate from copyright law,"10 thereby avoiding
any conflict with the Feist originality requirement."' In ad-
dition, the Commission extended the term of protection from
ten to fifteen years, which allows database compilers to pro-
tect their data for a longer period of time.
1 2
The revamped second tier also directs the Member States
to protect databases against the unfair extraction of all or a
substantial portion of the database's contents." 3 The end re-
sult provides database compilers with a stronger form of pro-
tection, while minimizing conflict of law issues. Most impor-
tantly, the Directive makes a clear distinction between
copyright protection for a database's format and the sui
generis right to protect the data itself. This distinction will
allow U.S. law to interface with the Directive's sui generis
right without conflicting with Feist."'
107. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
108. Directive, supra note 3, art. 1(1), at 24.
109. Id. art. 7(1), at 25.
110. Id.
111. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
112. Directive, supra note 3, art. 10(1), at 26.
113. Id. art. 7(1), at 25. Article 7(1) of the Directive provides:
Member States shall provide for a right for the maker of a database
which shows that there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a
substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or presen-
tation of the contents, to prevent acts of extraction and/or re-utilization
of the whole or substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quan-
titatively, of the contents of that database.
Id.
114. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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4. The Directive's Reciprocity Requirement
The availability of this new form of protection remains
quite limited. The Directive includes a reciprocity require-
ment that currently restricts enjoyment of the sui generis
right to European database companies. 115 In order for a U.S.
database company to enjoy the directive's sui generis protec-
tion, one of two things must happen: 1) The company must
either have a "continuous link with the economy of one of the
Member States," or 2) the United States must provide an
equivalent form of protection for European Union
databases.11 6 Consequently, database companies outside the
European Union are not protected by the Directive's second
tier unless their own country provides European companies
with equivalent protection. 1 7
Many U.S. database companies currently fall into this
classification and fail to satisfy the reciprocity requirement.
Therefore, the U.S. database industry fears it will have
trouble competing with the more protected European
database companies due to its failure to meet the Directive's
reciprocity requirement."' But what is so unique about the
Directive's two-tiered approach that makes it so attractive to
the U.S. database industry? The following section will
explain.
5. The Dynamics of the Directive's Comprehensive
Two- Tier Approach
The cumulative effect of the Directive's two-tier approach
is quite dynamic. When applied to a database that exhibits
115. Directive, supra note 3, art. 11, at 26-27. The Directive as amended
defines the beneficiaries of the sui generis protection as 1) nationals of a Mem-
ber State, 2) companies with their principal place of business within a Member
State, or 3) companies within non-member countries with whom the Council
agrees to extend reciprocal protection. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. See also discussion infra Part II.C.5.a (discussing the application of
the reciprocity doctrine). Any attempt by the United States to provide such
reciprocal protection would have to remain independent of copyright law in or-
der to avoid conflicting with the Supreme Court's ruling in Feist. Feist Publica-
tions, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352 (1991). In Feist, the
Supreme Court made copyright protection of raw facts within a database un-
constitutional. Id. But see Narayanan, supra note 3, at 484-91 (arguing that
the United States could constitutionally extend copyright law to protect
databases against unfair extraction).
118. IIA Perspective, supra note 10, at 2.
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at least some degree of originality in its selection and ar-
rangement of data (as do most),119 the database's owner will
benefit from two separate layers of protection.12 ° The first
layer will protect the database's format under copyright law
to the extent that the data's format is selected or arranged in
an original manner. 21 This term of protection for the format
can last as long as fifty to seventy-five years, depending on
the duration of copyright protection within each European
Union Member State.
The second layer will prohibit database users from ex-
tracting all or a significant portion of data from the database
for a period of fifteen years, assuming the concerned party
can show he or she has made a substantial investment in
compiling the data. 122 Had the second tier of protection
cross-pollinated with the first by using copyright law, the
rules for protecting raw data and the database's format could
have become quite muddled. For example, allowing copyright
law to protect unoriginal data would require courts to make
an exception to the originality requirement. Such a develop-
ment could prompt courts to form further exceptions to the
originality requirement, which in turn could lead to uncer-
tainty in the law's application for practitioners and ad hoc
decisionmaking by the courts.
1 23
However, the European Union steered clear of this slip-
pery slope by basing the unfair extraction provision on a sui
generis right separate from copyright. 124 By making this
clear separation between legal principles, the Directive
avoids confusing infringement of the sui generis right with
copyright infringement. 125 Member States and their courts
can also formulate a separate test for infringement excep-
119. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
120. In order to benefit from the second tier of protection, however, the
database owner must prove that he/she has made a substantial investment in
the database. Directive, supra note 3, art. 7(1), at 25.
121. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
123. IIA Perspective, supra note 10, at 17 (discussing the possibility of preju-
dicing copyright law by forming additional protection for databases).
124. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
125. Cobb, supra note 94, at 30-31.
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tions 26 that will not limit or expand copyright's fair use
defense. 127
In short, the Directive's two-tiered approach protects
both the original format and unoriginal data within a
database. The end result is a comprehensive protective
framework that maintains a clear distinction between copy-
right and the sui generis right.128 The U.S. database indus-
try, however, is still waiting for the United States to some-
how craft this same comprehensive form of protection for U.S.
database companies to enjoy. 129
C. The United States' Approach to International Database
Protection
1. Ambiguities in the Clinton Administration's
Database Agenda
As of October of 1996, the United States had not in-
creased its level of database protection, neither domestically
nor abroad. 130 However, the Clinton Administration's White
126. Any legislation or case law creating exceptions to the sui generis right
would have to fit within the parameters established in Article 9 of the Directive,
which provides:
Member States may stipulate that lawful users of a database which is
made available to the public in whatever manner may, without the au-
thorization of its maker, extract or re-utilize a substantial part of its
contents:
(a) in the case of extraction for private purposes of the contents of
a non-electronic database;
(b) in the case of extraction for the purposes of illustration for
teaching or scientific research ....
(c) in the case of extraction and/or re-utilization for the purposes
of public security or the proper performance of an administra-
tive or judicial procedure.
Directive, supra note 3, art. 9, at 26.
127. Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides that "[tihe fair use of
a copyrighted work ... is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1976).
128. Cobb, supra note 94, at 30-31.
129. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
130. The United States is signatory to the Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights known as TRIPs, but the level of protection
established for databases is no greater than the level provided by United States
copyright law. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, § 1, art. 10(2), 33
I.L.M. 83, 87 [hereinafter TRIPs]. Article 10(2) of the TRIPs agreement
provides:
Compilations of data or other material, whether in machine readable
or other form, which by reason of the selection or arrangement of their
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Paper on Intellectual Property and the National Information
Infrastructure, 131 does discuss sui generis database protection
within its international agenda. The White Paper, a "na-
tional strategy for promoting the National Information Infra-
structure,"u32 looks to the Berne Convention 33 and WIPO to
harmonize potential disparities in international database
protection through either a Berne Protocol or a New
Instrument. 134
Unfortunately, the White Paper does not explain what
the Berne Protocol and New Instrument are. Nor does it pro-
vide any insight into how the United States should negotiate
for international database protection. Finding the answers to
these questions begins with understanding the nature of
WIPO. As a UN agency, WIPO plays an essential role in ne-
gotiating multilateral intellectual property agreements
among its member nations.
135
2. The Emerging Role of WIPO
WIPO was formed in 1967 in Stockholm, Sweden, and
grew into a specialized agency of the United Nations by
1974.136 As of January 1996, WIPO administered eighteen
intellectual property treaties and Unions from its headquar-
ters in Geneva, Switzerland. 137 Its stated objectives are "to
promote the protection of intellectual property throughout
the world through cooperation among States" and "to ensure
administrative cooperation among the intellectual property
Unions." 138 As of January 1, 1996, there were 157 member
nations of WIPO working towards this goal. 139 Both the
contents constitute intellectual creations shall be protected as such.
Such protection, which shall not extend to the data or material itself,
shall be without prejudice to any copyright subsisting in the data or
material itself.
Id.
131. White Paper, supra note 11, at 153.
132. Id. at 2.
133. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
134. White Paper, supra note 11, at 153.
135. WIPO administrates the Berne Convention as well as seventeen other
international treaties and Unions concerning the protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights. WIPO GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 4, at 7-9.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 8-9.
138. Id. at 7.
139. Id. at 10.
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United States and all fifteen Member States of the European
Union are members of WIPO and signatories to the Berne
Convention. 140
Although WIPO does not directly take part in drafting or
negotiating new treaties, it often administrates and facili-
tates the revision and formation of treaties within its juris-
diction. 141 In the area of international copyright protection,
WIPO is involved in updating the Berne Convention through
the Berne Protocol as well as preparing new treaties to ad-
dress copyright-related concerns outside the scope of the
Berne Convention. 142
WIPO initiated negotiations for this process in Geneva,
where delegations from WIPO Member States and non-gov-
ernmental WIPO organizations, also referred to as NGO's,
convened to form the Committee of Experts. 143 Actually, two
Committees were formed; one for the Berne Protocol, an
agreement which would expand the protective scope of the
Berne Convention, and the other for the New Instrument, a
separate treaty to create new protection for the rights of per-
formers and producers of phonograms, which includes all mu-
sical recordings.14
The Committees met jointly in Geneva on several differ-
ent occasions to discuss various international copyright is-
sues, including the following: computer programs, sound re-
cordings, broadcasting and satellite communication,
distribution rights, digital transmission, photographic works,
and last but not least, databases protection. 145 After each
session, the Committee issued written reports, which contain
detailed summaries of the proceedings. 146 These reports
summarize treaty proposals, as well as the delegations' re-
sponse to such proposals. 147
140. Id. at 10-11.
141. WIPO GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 4, at 67.
142. Id. at 68.
143. Computer & Communication Industry Association, Special Report,
CCIA's Participation in the Final Session of the WIPO Experts Committee, at 1
(on file with the Santa Clara Law Library) [hereinafter CCIA Report]. CCIA is
a WIPO accredited non-governmental organization headquartered in Washing-
ton, D.C. Id.
144. Committee of Experts, supra note 19, at 1-2.
145. See generally id.
146. Id. at 26.
147. Id.
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The United States has taken an active role in WIPO's ne-
gotiation process and was among eighty other nations on the
Committees of Experts. 148 However, the United States has
not always played such an active role among the Berne Union
Nations. Before becoming a member of the Berne Union in
1989, the United States was unable to participate in such
Berne Convention treaty negotiations.
149
3. The Berne Convention: The Difference between a
Berne Protocol and a New Instrument
On March 1, 1989, the United States ended a century-old
stand off and joined the longest running treaty on interna-
tional copyright protection-the Berne Convention.15 0 In its
present form, the Berne Convention does not protect
databases per se.151 Nevertheless, it is possible for the Berne
Union countries to establish protection for works, such as
databases, that are not yet expressly protected by the Berne
Convention. There are several ways Berne Union countries
could create new provisions or agreements that would pro-
vide express protection for databases.
a. Revisions and Amendments to the Berne
Convention
One way to bring database protection into the Berne
Convention would be to revise or amend it. Substantive revi-
sions and amendments to the Berne Convention require una-
nimity in votes cast by all Berne Union countries present.
52
This process is quasi-legislative, as it binds all the Berne
Union countries to new substantive duties. 153 But the una-
148. The United States was one of 84 nations to attend the Committee of
Experts Final Session in May of 1996. Id.
149. A "Berne Union country" is a country party to the Berne Convention.
Berne Convention, supra note 133, art. 1. As of January 11, 1996, there were
117 Union countries. WIPO GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 4, at 51.
150. DAVID NIMMER, Special Supplement: Impossible Realities in 1 NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT 96 (1995). The Berne Convention was first formed in 1886. Id.
151. But see Berne Convention, supra note 133, art. 2(5) (providing protec-
tion for collections of works to the extent that the selection and arrangement of
their contents constitute intellectual creations). It is arguable whether "protec-
tion for collections of works" can be interpreted to include protection of compila-
tions of facts or data. Berne Convention, supra note 133, art. 2(5).
152. Berne Convention, supra note 133, art. 27(3).
153. 1 OSCAR SCHACHTER & CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, UNITED NATIONS LEGAL
ORDER 121 (1995).
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nimity requirement makes this process rather laborious and
difficult to achieve. Fortunately, Berne Union countries can
also enter individual agreements among themselves when
they do not wish to bind all the nations within the Berne
Union. 154
b. Protocols to the Berne Convention
Such individual agreements are termed protocols, which
can establish particular substantive obligations, like express
copyright protection for databases, between two or more
Berne Union countries.' 55 A Berne Protocol does not require
the unanimous approval of all Berne Union countries, as does
an amendment. 156 Only the countries entering into the pro-
tocol must agree on the new provisions, and only they are
bound. 157 However, Article 20 of the Berne Convention sets
two important limitations on Berne Protocols. 15  First, Berne
Protocols may not contain provisions that are contrary to
those found in the Berne Convention. 159 Second, they must
"grant to authors more extensive rights than those granted
by the Convention."' 6 ° In other words, Berne Union coun-
tries could not use a protocol to reduce their copyright obliga-
tions to each other, nor could they form protocols that contra-
dict pre-existing Berne Union obligations. The formation of
such protocols would effectively subvert the unanimity re-
quirement for amendments.
c. New Instruments
Fortunately, there is a third way for two or more Berne
Union countries to establish new treaty obligations while
avoiding the protocol's Article 20 limitations and the amend-
ment's unanimous approval requirement. This third treaty
option is called a New Instrument. Berne Union countries
and non-Union countries alike, who are united in their re-
solve can step outside the limits of the Berne Convention and
form a new agreement, or New Instrument. 16 1 A New Instru-
154. Berne Convention, supra note 133, art. 20.
155. SCHACHTER & JOYNER, supra note 153, at 92.





161. SCHACHTER & JOYNER, supra note 153, at 72.
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ment is a new treaty, which by its terms remains separate
from the Berne Convention. 16
2
Although a New Instrument does not have to conform to
the same Article 20 limitations as a Berne Protocol, it may
not undermine the principles of copyright law guaranteed by
the Berne Convention.' 63 If WIPO allowed such treaties to
form, the New Instrument might conflict with the provisions
in the Berne Convention. Such an outcome would be counter
productive to WIPO's stated objectives,1 6 4 thereby factionaliz-
ing rather than harmonizing world intellectual property pro-
tection. 165 The New Instrument referred to in the Clinton
Administration's White Paper is one of the new treaties cur-
rently under negotiation within WIPO. 166 WIPO's Commit-
tee of Experts has proposed a New Instrument to protect the
rights of performers and producers of audio recordings, a
form of protection which is not provided by the Berne
Convention. 167
4. Initiating the Treaty-Making Process: Proposed
Treaty Language for International Database
Protection.
In general, U.S. treaty-making consists of two basic
steps: negotiation and ratification.168 The Executive Branch
has the authority to negotiate treaties, but two thirds of the
Senate must consent to the negotiated terms before the
treaty is ratified and binding upon the United States.
169
Therefore, the President and his Administration hold the
reigns and are free to guide negotiations in any direction they
believe the Senate will follow. To ensure that the WIPO
treaty negotiations addressed database protection, the Clin-
162. Id.
163. To form a treaty that conflicts with the Berne Convention would conflict
with WIPO's stated objective. See supra text accompanying note 138.
164. See supra text accompanying note 138.
165. WIPO GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 4, at 7.
166. Committee of Experts on a Possible Instrument for the Protection of the
Rights of Performers and Producers of Phonograms, WIPO Report (Sept. 4 to 8
and 12, 1995) (WIPO document BCP/CEN/9-INR/CE/IV/8) (on file with the
Santa Clara University Law Library).
167. Id.
168. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
169. Id.
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ton Administration proposed treaty language that included
database protection provisions.
170
On November 29, 1995, the United States sent treaty
language to Dr. Arpad Bogsch, Director General of WIPO.
17 1
The language proposed protecting databases under the Berne
Protocol to the extent that U.S. copyright law would allow.
172
However, the initial proposal did not offer a new form of sui
generis protection for databases, which resulted in a rather
thin layer of database protection. 173  But on February 1,
1996, the European Union submitted a treaty proposal to
WIPO, which did include sui generis database protection. 74
The European Union modeled many of its treaty provisions
after the Database Directive.
75
Not to be outdone by the Europeans, the United States
submitted a second treaty proposal on May 23, 1996 to WIPO
at the Committee of Experts' final session.1 76 The U.S. propo-
sal was made on the same day Congressman Moorhead intro-
170. Article 2(3) of the United States' 1995 November Proposal for a Protocol
to the Berne Convention provides:
Collections of data or other material, in any form, which by reason of
the selection or arrangement of their contents constitute intellectual
creations are protected as such. Such protection does not extend to the
data or the material itself and is without prejudice to any rights sub-
sisting in the data or material contained in the collection.
Berne Protocol Proposal, supra note 16, art. 2(3).
171. The Director General is elected by WIPO's General Assembly as the ex-
ecutive head of WIPO. WIPO GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 4, at 10.
172. Berne Protocol Proposal, supra note 16 (see accompanying letter to the
Berne Protocol Proposal).
173. See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the thin nature of copyright
protection for databases).
174. Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention,
WIPO Report: Proposal for the International Harmonization of the Sui Generis
Protection of Databases (Feb. 1 to 9, 1996) (WIPO document BCP/CE/VI/13) (on
file with the Santa Clara University Law Library).
175. As with the Database Directive, the European Union Treaty Proposal
includes a 15 year term of protection against the unauthorized extraction of
data from a database. Id. art. 6(1), at 3.
176. Committee of Experts, supra note 19, at 26. The U.S. Proposal for Sui
Generis Protection of Databases provides:
Contracting Parties shall protect all databases that represent a sub-
stantial investment in the collection, assembly, verification, organiza-
tion, or presentation of the database contents, whether or not such
database is commercially available or otherwise made to the public,
regardless of the form or medium in which the database is embodied,
and regardless of whether the database or any of its contents are intel-
lectual creations or are protected under other domestic legislation.
U.S. Sui Generis Treaty Proposal, supra note 15, art. 1.3.
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duced the Database Investment and Intellectual Property
Antipiracy Act of 1996,177 and was designed to protect
against unauthorized data extraction from databases.
178
Like the European Union treaty proposal, the U.S. pro-
posal included a sui generis form of protection to remain sepa-
rate from copyright and other forms of legal protection.
179
However, significant differences exist between the two pro-
posals. Most noticeably, the U.S. proposal provides for a 25-
year term of protection as opposed to the European Union's
fifteen years and also requires national treatment to apply.'1 0
No matter what form of database protection the United
States proposes, the same limitations of foreign policy on
treaty formation apply.' In addition to policy limitations,
the U.S. Constitution requires two-thirds of the Senate to rat-
ify all treaties negotiated by the Executive branch before
such treaties become binding on the United States.8 2
5. United States Treaty-Making Policy: National
Treatment and Self-Executing Treaties
a. National Treatment vs. Reciprocity
National treatment 8 3 is the cornerstone to the United
States' treaty-making policy.'8 4 The Clinton Administration
has stated that "[a]t an absolute minimum, national treat-
ment must apply to the minimum obligations established in
177. U.S. Database Investment Act, supra note 77.
178. CCIA Report, supra note 143, at 5.
179. U.S. Sui Generis Treaty Proposal, supra note 15, art. 7.1. The U.S. pro-
posal provides:
The protection under this [Instrument] shall be without prejudice to
provisions concerning copyright, rights related to copyright of any
other rights or obligations in the database or its contents, including
laws in respect to patent, trademark, design rights, antitrust or compe-
tition, trade secrets, data protection and privacy, access to public docu-
ments, and the law of contract.
Id.
180. Id. art. 6 and art. 11. See CCIA Report, supra note 143.
181. See discussion infra Part II.C.5.a (discussing the policy limitations on
United States treaty negotiations).
182. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
183. The White Paper defines national treatment as a guarantee that "under
a nation's laws, a foreigner enjoys no lesser rights and benefits than a citizen of
that nation receives, subject to the specific terms of the relevant international
conventions." White Paper, supra note 11, at 140.
184. Id. at 150.
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any agreement in WIPO."1' 5 The Berne Convention ex-
pressly requires national treatment to apply to all copy-
righted works under the Convention.' 86 Therefore, any addi-
tional rights and obligations created in the Berne Protocol
would also enjoy national treatment as opposed to
reciprocity.'1 7
The distinction between national treatment and reciproc-
ity is quite significant. Under national treatment, any new
form of database protection included in a treaty would re-
quire each member-nation to provide foreigners with the min-
imum level of protection established by the treaty in addition
to whatever extra protection they might provide their own
nationals. 118
Suppose for a moment that the United States and the
UK formed a treaty that provided a certain level of database
protection. If national treatment applied, and the British
level of domestic database protection exceeded the level re-
quired by the treaty, a U.S. database company in Britain
would enjoy the same level of protection as British nationals.
On the other hand, if the level of database protection for Brit-
ish nationals fell below the minimum standard required by
the treaty, the UK would have to provide U.S. database com-
panies with the treaty's higher level of protection. Under na-
tional treatment, U.S. companies would always receive the
highest level of protection available, whether it was the mini-
mum level provided by the treaty or the level established by
Britain's domestic laws.
Under reciprocity conditions, there would be no like
guarantee that Britain's higher level of protection would ap-
ply to U.S. nationals. If British protection exceeded the
treaty's minimum level, U.S. database companies could not
benefit from the British protection unless the United States
provided the same heightened level of protection for British
185. Id.
186. Berne Convention, supra note 133, art. 5(1). Article 5(1) provides:
Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected
under this convention, in countries of the Berne Union other than the
country of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may
hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially
granted by this Convention.
Id.
187. Id.
188. WIPO GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 4, at 49-50.
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databases.- 9 This principle of "I'll scratch your back only as
well as you scratch mine" violates the very spirit of national
treatment by discriminating against foreign nationals based
on a reciprocity requirement. Although the concept of na-
tional treatment is rather straight-forward, the question re-
mains as to what happens when the applicable U.S. law does
not meet a treaty's minimum requirements; can U.S. treaty
obligations directly increase the level of legal protection
available in the United States? In short, the answer is no.
b. The Berne Convention is not a Self-Executing
Treaty
The United States does not consider the substantive obli-
gations within most treaties to be self-executing. 190 In other
words, most U.S. treaty obligations do not have the same ef-
fect as legislation and therefore cannot create new forms of
legal protection within the United States. The United States
Copyright Office has expressly stated that the Berne Conven-
tion is not self-executing upon the United States' domestic
application of copyright law.19 ' Consequently, Berne Con-
vention treaty obligations cannot directly increase the level of
protection provided by the Copyright Act of 1976.192
In 1988, Congress passed the Berne Implementation Act
before ratifying the treaty a year later.193 Through this legis-
lation, Congress intended to bring the Copyright Act of 1976
into compliance with the Berne Convention's substantive pro-
visions that exceeded U.S. copyright protection. 194 The end
result was a virtually contemporaneous increase in U.S. copy-
right protection on the domestic and international level.
However, following the passage of the Berne Implemen-
tation Act, certain provisions within the Berne Convention
still exceeded the level of protection provided under U.S.
copyright law. For example, U.S. copyright did not protect an
189. White Paper, supra note 11, at 140.
190. Harriet L. Oler, U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, in THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE SPEAKS 31 (Prentice Hall & Business 1992). A self-executing
treaty is one which establishes domestic obligations for the parties entering
into the agreement, thereby having the same effect as domestic legislation. Id.
191. Id.
192. U.S.C. Title 17 (1976).
193. Berne Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3949
(1989).
194. Id.
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author's moral rights to the same extent as the Berne Con-
vention. 195 Without moral rights, U.S. authors within the
United States could not "object to any distortion, mutilation
or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation
to" their works, as they could in other Berne Union
countries. 19
6
Other discrepancies remained between the Berne Con-
vention and U.S. copyright protection following the United
States' 1989 entry into the Berne Union. For example, in
1989 the U.S. Copyright Act only protected architectural "di-
agrams, models, and technical drawings, including architec-
tural plans,"197 whereas article 2.1 of the Berne Convention
included three-dimensional "works of architecture" among
the protected subject matter of copyright. 198 Not until 1990
did Congress bridge the gap between the two bodies of law by
passing the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of
1990.199
The Act broadened the scope of domestic copyright pro-
tection to include certain original, non-standard elements
embodied in three-dimensional works of architecture. 20 0 The
House Report on the amendment identified the sole purpose
of the Act as the need to "place the United States unequivo-
cally in compliance with its Berne Convention obligations."2"1
The mere necessity of this Act illustrates that the Berne Con-
vention is not self-executing upon U.S. law. Once a treaty
has been ratified, it is up to the House of Representatives and
the Senate to bring U.S. law up to speed with multilateral
treaty obligations by passing federal legislation.
195. Berne Convention, supra note 133, art. 6. Moral rights for authors are
independent of the author's economic rights and cannot be transferred. Id. The
right exists to protect the author's creative signature that is inherent to the
work, and any modification of the work that alters the author's creative signa-
ture infringes his or her moral rights. Id.
196. Id.
197. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
198. Berne Convention, supra note 133, art. 2(1).
199. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
650, 104 Stat. 5133 (1991) (amending § 102(a) of Title 17 to include "architec-
tural works" as protectable subject matter of copyright).
200. Id. (amending § 101 of Title 17 to define the protected elements of an
"architectural work").
201. H.R. Rep. No. 101-735, at 18-21, 24 (1990).
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III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
As recommended by the White Paper, the United States
has worked with WIPO to include database protection in re-
cent multilateral treaty negotiations.20 2 However, neither
the White Paper nor the U.S. treaty proposals articulate why
the United States should pursue international database pro-
tection rather than simply adopt more protective domestic
legislation. In addition, neither source explains how
database protection in the Berne Protocol and a New Instru-
ment will combine to protect United States interests. The fol-
lowing section analyzes various rationale for the United
States' desire to establish international database
protection.2 °3
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Identifying The United States' Rational for
International Database Protection
1. The Unique threat to the United States Database
Industry from Abroad
It may be possible under the power of the Commerce
Clause204 for Congress to enact a form of sui generis database
protection that would satisfy the Directive's reciprocity re-
quirement.2 °5 However, after enduring five years of post-
Feist pressure, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has
increased the level of legal protection afforded to
databases.2"6 Waiting for Congress to act is a risk the
database industry does not want to take, because the longer
202. See discussion supra Part II.C.4.
203. See discussion infra Part IV.
204. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3.
205. See Narayanan, supra note 3, at 492 (arguing that the U.S. has the
power to protect against unfair extraction under the Commerce Clause, as there
is no intra-federal preemption).
206. Although the Supreme Court has not revisited the issue of copyright
protection for databases since Feist, many federal circuit court decisions have
applied the Feist originality test when assessing the copyrightability of various
database compilations. See Warren Publ'g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 67 F.3d
276 (11th Cir. 1995); CCC Info. Servs. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d
61 (2d Cir. 1994); Kregos v. Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir. 1993); Bell-
south Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 (11th
Cir. 1993); Key Publications, Inc., v. Chinatown Today Publ'g Enter., 945 F.2d
509 (2d Cir. 1991).
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it takes for the Database Investment Act to become law,20 7
the longer the raw data within U.S. databases remains
unprotected.
Meanwhile, under the Directive, European databases are
protected against the unauthorized extraction of raw data.20 8
This disparity between U.S. and European Union database
protection could give European database companies a distinct
advantage. As long as the disparity lasts, European compa-
nies will be free to copy raw data within U.S. databases at
will, while the data within European databases will remain
protected by the Directive's sui generis right. Consequently,
the U.S. database industry fears it can no longer compete on
a level playing field as long as European database companies
can legally extract raw data from U.S. databases.20 9
This fear of international exploitation is quite different
from the threat of domestic piracy. 210 After Feist, all U.S.
database companies faced a heightened risk of piracy.211 But
at least the level of risk was the same industry-wide, and no
one class of companies could claim a higher level of legal pro-
tection than another.212 This level playing field will no longer
exist internationally once the Directive's sui generis right and
reciprocity requirement become law among the Member
States.21 3 Eventually, the Directive could enable the Euro-
pean database industry to compete as a protected class of
companies. As such, the European database industry would
have an advantage that no U.S. database company has ever
enjoyed over another.
In response to this threat, the Clinton Administration
has addressed the issue of international database protection
207. U.S. Database Investment Act, supra note 77. At the time this com-
ment went to print, the Database Investment Act had not become law.
208. The sui generis right protects the data or raw facts within European
Union databases for 15 years. Directive, supra note 3, art. 10(1), at 26. Raw
facts within United States databases, on the other hand, may be copied at will
at any time. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350
(1991). It is true, however, that some United States companies will qualify for
sui generis database protection in Europe if they have subsidiaries or signifi-
cant business contact within the European Union. See Directive, supra note 3,
art. 11, at 26-27.
209. IIA Perspective, supra note 10, at 2.
210. See discussion supra Part II.A.
211. See discussion supra Part II.A.
212. See discussion supra Part II.A.
213. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing how directives
reach enactment by the European Union Member States).
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in its White Paper.214 However, the Administration failed to
clarify why it was so important to pursue international
database protection. In short, the United States' primary ob-
jective should be to negotiate for a form of international
database protection that levels the international playing field
for U.S. database companies.
This section analyzes why meeting this objective quickly
best satisfies the interests of the American taxpayer, the U.S.
database industry, and the Clinton Administration. In addi-
tion, negotiating for a level of international protection that is
higher than the level provided domestically is consistent with
established U.S. treaty-making policy.
215
2. The American Taxpayer
"The international treaty-making process is usually not
"1216 A h
cheap and may in fact be enormously expensive. As the
international market for intellectual property continues to
grow in size and complexity, the cost and effort required to
harmonize the law through the treaty process will only in-
crease.217 The longer the United States waits to negotiate in-
tellectual property treaties, the deeper the federal govern-
ment must dip into the taxpayer's pocket. Acting proactively
and pushing for a suitable international agreement, the
United States can cut the cost of the treaty-making process.
Of course, rushing into an agreement or treaty that pro-
vides an insufficient level of protection would only result in
greater expense. 218 Due to the high cost of modern treaty-
making, it is now more important than ever to proceed strate-
gically and consider carefully which type of agreement will
best provide the desired level of protection.2 19 Any shortcom-
ings in database protection that remain after the current
round of WIPO negotiations may leave the international
playing field tipped in the European Union's favor.22 °
If this were the case, and the U.S. database industry was
indeed exploited,22 ' the United States would be forced to re-
214. White Paper, supra note 11, at 153.
215. See discussion supra Part II.C.5.b.




220. See discussion supra Part 1V.A.1.
221. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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negotiate the database issue down the road to protect its
database industry from further harm. Therefore, failure to
meet the European Union's level of protection 222 during the
current round of negotiations may simply increase the cost of
legal harmonization.
Failure to negotiate now for international database pro-
tection may also weaken the United States' hand in future
negotiations. If European Union database companies were
given sufficient time and opportunity to exploit the U.S.
database industry under the Directive's reciprocity require-
ment,223 the European Union may disfavor international har-
monization with its higher level of database protection. Why
would European Union nations want to agree to a treaty that
would eliminate its competitive advantage?224 If this were
the case, convincing the European Union Member States to
part with the advantages of reciprocity would have its price.
The United States would have to sweeten the pot with eco-
nomic incentives, paid for by American taxpayers.
However, if WIPO facilitates comprehensive interna-
tional database protection before European Union nations re-
ally have time to implement the Directive, the European
Union database companies will not have a chance to take ad-
vantage of their more protective law. Therefore, the sooner
national treatment applies to a comprehensive form of inter-
national database protection, the less negotiation costs the
American taxpayer.
3. The Advantages of International Harmonization to
the Database Industry
The U.S. database industry is also likely to benefit finan-
cially from international database protection that is
equivalent to the level of protection provided by the European
Union Directive. At the very least, U.S. database companies
require a level international playing field. An increase in do-
mestic database protection should not be their primary con-
222. This standard consists of the Directive's second tier of sui generis
database protection. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
224. A treaty on database protection based on national treatment would act
to trump the Directive's reciprocity provision by requiring European Union na-
tions to provide the same heightened level of sui generis protection to U.S.
database companies. See discussion supra Part II.C.5.a.
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cern, because there is no unique threat from within the fifty
states.225
Since the Feist decision in 1991, the U.S. database indus-
try has grown rapidly.226 This reality, more than anything,
undercuts the argument that the fear of Feist alone will pre-
vent companies from investing in domestic database develop-
ment. Unlike the fear of Feist, however, the unique threat of
the Directive may create a protected class of European com-
panies with whom the U.S. database industry could find it
difficult to compete.227
a. The Importance of Establishing International
Sui Generis Protection
The European Union's database industry claims it has
not enjoyed such a prosperous growth rate as that of the
United States.228 In fact, in its Green Paper on database pro-
tection, the European Union cited the need for industry
growth as a primary reason for developing greater protec-
tion.229 What better way to protect existing databases and
facilitate growth, than to enable European Union database
companies to safely exploit existing U.S. resources? As long
as the United States has no means to provide an equivalent
level of protection for European Union databases, European
Union companies could continue to extract valuable data
from U.S. databases while remaining protected from similar
exploitation by U.S. database companies.
The United States can eliminate this threat by forming a
multilateral treaty with the European Union and other inter-
ested nations to extend sui generis protection to databases.
As long as the international agreement is based on national
treatment rather that requiring reciprocity,23 ° the U.S.
database companies seeking protection within the European
Union would receive at least the same level of sui generis pro-
tection as European Union nationals.23 '
225. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
226. White Paper, supra note 11, at 153.
227. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
228. Green Paper, supra note 78, at 5.
229. Id.
230. See discussion supra Part II.C.5.
231. See discussion supra Part II.C.5.a.
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b. The Importance of Expanding the International
Copyright Standard
The U.S. database industry would also benefit from a
multilateral agreement that provided copyright protection for
databases among other Berne Union countries. Although the
European Union Directive does not require reciprocity for
copyright protection to apply to U.S. database companies, 232
there is good reason to include a copyright provision in the
Berne Protocol.
Using the Berne Protocol to extend copyright protection
to a database's format could further existing efforts to create
an international standard. Member Nations of the World
Trade Organization who have entered the TRIPs agreement
are already bound by this international standard.23 3 They
are obligated to provide a minimum level of copyright protec-
tion for the original selection and arrangement of data.2 34
Providing for this same protection in the Berne Protocol
would extend the same international standard to Berne
Union countries outside the European Union that are not
bound by TRIPs.235 China, for example, is obviously not a
member of the European Union, nor is it signatory to
TRIPs.23 6 China is, however, a member of the Berne Conven-
tion and could therefore sign onto the Berne Protocol and be
bound by its substantive copyright requirements.23 7
Berne Union countries such as China, which are not
bound by TRIPs or the European Union Directive, are cur-
rently not obligated by the Berne Convention to provide any
copyright protection for the original formatting of U.S.
databases.238 Therefore, the Berne Protocol is an effective
way to bring select nations within the Berne Union into com-
pliance with the same minimum standard of copyright pro-
tection established in TRIPs and the European Union Direc-
232. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
233. See TRIPs, supra note 130 and accompanying text.
234. See id.
235. Like the Berne Convention, TRIPs requires member nations to afford
national treatment to each other. See supra note 130, art. 3.
236. See supra note 130.
237. WIPO GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 4, at 8.
238. But see supra note 205.
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tive.2 39 U.S. database companies would benefit from greater
global copyright protection to the extent that the Berne Pro-
tocol increased the number of nations in compliance with the
international standard.
4. How the Clinton Administration Benefits from
Establishing International Database Protection
Perhaps the primary interest for any first-term Adminis-
tration is self-preservation through the re-election of the
President. The White Paper has made increased interna-
tional database protection a part of the Clinton Administra-
tion's political agenda. 240 The United States' largest commer-
cial database companies are also a potential source of
significant campaign contributions. Consequently, the Ad-
ministration would pay a substantial political price if it failed
to at least negotiate for international, sui generis database
protection as promised.
241
5. Lack of Sui Generis Protection at Home Does Not
Limit the United States' Negotiation Process
The current lack of sui generis database protection
within the United States does not prevent it from negotiating
multilateral treaty obligations that include sui generis
database protection. U.S. treaty obligations can be negoti-
ated independently from domestic law, because the treaty ob-
ligations are not self-executing.24 2
The creation of new intellectual property rights through
treaty formation often prompts Congress to enact equivalent
domestic legislation.2 43 This chain reaction may raise a ques-
tion of legislative control; that is, which branch of the federal
government ultimately controls the domestic level of intellec-
tual property protection, Congress or the Administration ne-
gotiating a new treaty? But one thing is clear, the Executive
Branch and the Senate can form treaties that will place new
forms of intellectual property protection on the legislative
239. This is assuming that the Berne Union countries that are not presently
bound to an international standard for copyright protection would, in fact, sign
onto the Berne Protocol.
240. White Paper, supra note 11, at 153.
241. Id.
242. See supra note 190.
243. See discussion supra Part II.C.5.b.
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agenda. Both the Berne Convention 44 and TRIPs245 estab-
lished new forms of copyright protection that prompted Con-
gress to amend the 1976 Copyright Act.
B. Why There is no Single-Treaty Solution to the United
States' Database Dilemma
The Clinton Administration originally supported the
Committee of Experts' decision to address international
database protection in the Berne Protocol as opposed to in a
New Instrument.246 However, as a part of the Berne Conven-
tion, the Berne Protocol can only provide new forms of copy-
right protection, subject to the inherent limitations of Article
20 of the Berne Convention.247 Consequently, any form of
database protection that the United States proposes for the
Berne Protocol must be limited to copyright protection. In or-
der to conform to this requirement, the United States' initial
proposal for database protection followed the form of copy-
right protection established in Feist248 and lacked the sui
generis protection found in the European Union Directive.249
It would be impossible to include a sui generis form of
protection in the Berne Protocol. It legally does not fit. The
legal foundation of the Berne Convention is based on copy-
right law. Any rights arising under the Berne Convention
through an Article 20 protocol must stem from the author's
right to protect his or her work as an original creation. This
originality requirement excludes the sui generis protection of
data within a database, just as Feist limits the protective
reach of U.S. copyright law.250 Therefore, it is impossible to
fit the non-copyright, sui generis tier of the Directive's protec-
tive framework within the Berne Protocol.
Then why not build the Directive's two-tiered approach
in a New Instrument that is separate from the Berne Conven-
244. See supra note 193.
245. Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act on December 8,
1994. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 104-12, 109 Stat. 252
(1995). The Act included amendments to the Copyright Act of 1976 that were
necessary to bring United States law into conformity with TRIPs. NIMMER,
supra note 150, at 7.
246. See discussion supra Part II.C.4.
247. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.b.
248. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 106 and accompanying Lext.
250. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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tion? In a separate treaty, the sui generis provision would not
be subject to Article 20 limitations251 and would not conflict
with the originality requirement of copyright law.252 Unfor-
tunately, this single-treaty approach is also an impossibility.
In order to equal the Directive's two-tiered form of protection,
the first tier would have to be based on copyright law.253 But
the whole point of forming the New Instrument was to step
outside of copyright law and escape its limitations on sui
generis database protection. Therefore, without copyright
law as a foundation, there would be no legal basis upon which
to build the first-tier's copyright protection. Failure to in-
clude this first tier would leave the selection and arrange-
ment of a database's format less protected from international
exploitation, allowing countries such as China to ignore the
international copyright standard.25 4
It appears at first glance the Clinton Administration was
between a rock and a hard place in trying to achieve what
was its primary objective: to use copyright law and a sui
generis form of protection to guard both the database's format
and the raw data on the international level.
255
V. PROPOSAL
Fortunately, there is indeed a way to achieve comprehen-
sive international database protection. In order to best pro-
tect the interests of the American taxpayer, the U.S.
database industry, the Clinton Administration, and satisfy
U.S. treaty-making policy, the United States has negotiated
for the same type of comprehensive database protection pro-
vided by the European Union Directive's two-tiered approach.
Although neither the Berne Protocol nor a New Instrument
could provide both forms of database protection on its own,
the two treaties combined can sufficiently protect the format
and raw data within a database on the international level.
The simple solution is to break the two forms of database pro-
tection apart and negotiate for two separate international
agreements. Accordingly, it is crucial for the United States to
negotiate for copyright protection in the Berne Protocol and
251. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.b.
252. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
254. See discussion supra Part IV.A.3.a.
255. See discussion supra Part V.A.
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sui generis protection in a separate New Instrument for the
Sui Generis Protection of Databases.
The European Union would have to sign onto both the
Berne Protocol and the New Instrument, and national treat-
ment must apply, for this approach to be ideal. If both agree-
ments are successfully negotiated, and the U.S. Senate rati-
fies the New Instrument (which, in effect, is an entirely new
treaty requiring consent from two-thirds of the Senate), the
protective framework would operate just like the European
Union Directive.256
This solution provides two separate layers of database
protection for signatory countries of both agreements.25 7
Copyright protection in the Berne Protocol protects the
database's format to the extent that the format's selection or
arrangement of the facts is original. At the same time, it does
not effect any additional, non-copyright forms of data protec-
tion.258 Meanwhile, separate protection from the New In-
strument for the Sui Generis Protection of Databases prohib-
its database users from extracting all or a significant portion
of the database's raw data.25 9 By separating the tiers of pro-
tection into two different agreements, neither form of protec-
tion increases or reduces the protective scope of the other.26 °
The end product conforms with the United States' objective to
create a comprehensive form of international database pro-
tection equivalent to the level provided by the European
Union Directive. Ultimately, U.S. taxpayers, the U.S.
database industry, and the Clinton Administration are likely
to benefit from this approach by reducing the risk of interna-
tional database piracy.261
This international solution also enables the House of
Representatives to wait and consider whether it should sup-
port federal legislation for the sui generis protection of
databases without leaving U.S. database companies totally
unprotected from international piracy. As long as the New
Instrument for the Sui Generis Protection of Databases is not
ratified as a self-executing treaty, Congress would have the
256. See discussion supra Part II.B.5.
257. See discussion supra Part II.B.5.
258. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
260. See discussion supra Part II.B.5.
261. See discussion supra Part V.A.
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opportunity to once again assess whether or not it should
pass domestic legislation that complies with U.S. treaty obli-
gations.2 62 The Senate may express its approval of greater
database protection by ratifying the treaty, leaving the House
of Representatives with the role of gatekeeper to decide
whether domestic legislation is necessary.
The House must exercise great discretion before passing
domestic legislation that conforms with new treaty obliga-
tions, otherwise its role will be reduced to rubber-stamping
bills that conform with the Senate's international agenda.
The House thus ensures that treaty provisions negotiated by
the Executive Branch and ratified by the Senate are not used
to railroad federal legislation through Congress at the ex-
pense of domestic interests. Such vigilance should apply
whether the legislation is for the sui generis protection of
databases or any other area of intellectual property law. In
the case of database protection, Congress may refuse to in-
crease the level of domestic protection on the grounds that it
would reduce the public's access to facts and data currently in
the public domain.
VI. CONCLUSION
Establishing a comprehensive form of international
database protection is important for numerous reasons, many
of which are discussed above. But most importantly, an effec-
tive international standard among WIPO Member States will
quickly harmonize the different standards between U.S. copy-
right law and the European Database Directive. Once inter-
national harmonization occurs, Congress may then find it
necessary to pass the Database Investment Act to bring U.S.
law into compliance with U.S. treaty obligations.263 These
new obligations are likely to result from the Senate's even-
tual ratification of the New Instrument for the Sui Generis
Protection of Databases.
Presently, the international, rather than domestic,
threat of database exploitation poses the greatest risk to the
262. Congress waited two years before passing the Architectural Works
Copyright Protection Act of 1990 after the Senate ratified the Berne Convention
in 1989. See discussion supra Part II.B.5.b.
263. U.S. Database Investment Act, supra note 77.
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U.S. database industry.264 In reality, it is the European
Union, rather than the Feist decision, that has set the agenda
for international database protection by enacting the
Database Directive. The unavailability of the Directive's sui
generis form of protection to U.S. database companies has
placed the U.S. database industry at a competitive disadvan-
tage.26 '5 Therefore, in order to level the international playing
field, it is necessary for the United States to negotiate for
database protection with the Directive's comprehensive, two-
tiered approach in mind.266 Only by forming copyright pro-
tection for a database's format (provided by the Berne Proto-
col) and sui generis protection for raw data (provided by a
New Instrument), will WIPO achieve the Directive's compre-
hensive form of database protection and reduce the unique
threat of international exploitation for the U.S. database
industry.
W. Matthew Wayman*
264. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the United States' growing
concern with international database piracy).
265. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1
266. See discussion supra Part II.B.5 (discussing the comprehensive nature
of the Directive's two-tiered approach).
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